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Abstract
This article has a central  aim of explaining the 
catastrophic loss of civilian life in the last five months of 
the civil war in Sri Lanka. The article proposes that both 
the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the LTTE are 
culpable for civilian deaths; the LTTE in an effort to stave 
off defeat so it might be able to re-constitute itself at a 
later time, and the GoSL in a determination not to allow 
the LTTE as an organization to survive the conflict. The 
article also argues that a preliminary explanation for the 
origins of the Sri Lankan civil war can be found in the 
GoSL program of transferring members of the Sinhalese 
population into the Northern and Eastern provinces of the 
country, regions held by the Tamil population to be their 
homeland territory.
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I.  COMMUNAL VIOLENCE
Most observers have placed the start of the civil war 
in Sri Lanka as the summer of 1983, after a Sinhalese 
pogrom against the Tamil population occurred, mostly 
in the Colombo region. To some degree the anti-Tamil 
riots were seen as a response to the deaths of thirteen 
Sinhalese soldiers killed by LTTE ambush. The LTTE did 
exist prior to this event, having formed by at least 1976 
under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran (Ridenour, 
2009). But the organization gained innumerable recruits 
as a consequence of the 1983 rioting, which destroyed 
hundreds of Tamil homes and businesses (ICG, 2010, 
p.29). Although estimates vary, the number of Tamils 
killed may have been as high as 4,000. Although there 
were periods of relative peace or low-level fighting 
between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the 
LTTE, the civil war did not conclude until May, 2009, 
twenty-six years later. 
My argument offered as an explanation for the origins 
of the civil war in Sri Lanka is based on the expressed 
desire of a minority population to preserve their culture 
and distinctiveness as a people, in the face of efforts by 
the state to establish conditions degrading or suppressing 
that distinctiveness. Why a specific population retains this 
desire has been put in the following terms.
The people who inhabit a certain territory form a political 
community. Through custom and practice as well as by explicit 
political decision they create laws, establish individual or 
collective property rights, engage in public works, [and] shape 
the physical appearance of the territory. […] All of these 
activities give them an attachment to the land that cannot be 
matched by any rival claimants. This in turn justifies their claim 
to exercise continuing political authority over that territory 
(emphasis in original) (Miller, 1998, p.68).
It is only through gaining political authority, i.e., 
achieving self-government, which has often been labeled 
“self-determination,” that the minority population has 
some assurance their nation will endure. Although it is 
an oversimplification, the initiation of a settler program 
inserted into the territory contested by the state and the 
minority population, could be seen as just cause for the 
commencement of an insurgency; that is, to negate an 
effort by the state to extinguish prior minority claims to 
the contested territory, and thus “suppress” the minority 
culture. The underlying theoretical question is whether 
self-determination can be separated from territory. In 
was the inability of the Tamil and Sinhalese peoples to 
resolve that question that brought about the civil war. 
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One means by which the state can attempt to accomplish 
this suppression is through the establishment of a 
“settler” program through which members of the majority 
population (nationally) are inserted into the territory 
claimed by the minority population as their “homeland.” 
Although national governments have sometimes 
claimed the motivation for a settler program was to 
promote the economic development of a particular 
region, the authenticity of such claims is often contested 
by some portion of the region’s population. Insurgent 
groups have challenged the legitimacy of such programs 
on the grounds that the non-minority population settlers 
are generally granted “entitlements” to land not offered 
to minority population members, as was clearly the 
case in Sri Lanka (ICG, 2008b, p.4; Tigno, 2006, p.28). 
Even more fundamentally, however, is the challenge 
made to settler programs based on the unwillingness 
of the insurgents to recognize the right of the national 
government to institute a development program in the 
contested region of the state at all (Oberst, 1996, p.33-35).
Violence by Tamil insurgents was targeted explicitly 
toward Sinhalese settlers residing in a proclaimed Tamil 
homeland at least as early as the mid-1980s (Pfaffenberger, 
1987, p.159). From the insurgent point of view such 
a campaign is meant to end or even reverse the settler 
program, thus strengthening the ratio of minority versus 
(national) majority population in the “homeland” region, 
turning the ratio more in the former’s favor. 
The belief was that a turn in population ratio in favor 
of a minority population would buttress the insurgent 
argument for self-determination, due to the resulting 
increased homogeneity of the homeland resident 
population.
In 1985, during the peace conference in Thimpu, the 
United Tamil groups made it one of their four points to 
be acknowledged that because they were a nation of their 
own they had an exclusive right to their homeland in the 
North and East, where none but they should be entitled 
to settle. No new Sinhalese settlers should be allowed to 
cultivate the traditional Tamil areas, although those who 
were already there could remain. The militant groups 
underlined this demand with violent and bloody attacks 
on Sinhalese settlers in the Northeast who dared to defy 
their order to stay out (Hellman-Rajanayagam, 1990, p.80) 
(emphasis added).
The following comment has been made regarding the 
movement of Sinhalese settlers into the Northeast part of 
the country:
When inter-ethnic violence increased in the 1980s, these 
settlement schemes became a theatre of inter-ethnic contestation 
and violence and became interwoven with military and political 
strategies of the major conflict parties. After the military 
contestation between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE 
aggravated, some segments in the Sinhalese regime and the 
military used new ‘strategic’ settlement schemes to weaken the 
basis of Tamil claims to a Northeast homeland. LTTE attacks on 
Sinhalese settlers and army retaliation against Tamil villagers 
were common practice during these early periods of heightened 
confrontation (Korf and Fünfgeld, 2006).
Demography in the Northeast
The land colonization policy of successive Sri Lankan 
governments has caused much resentment. It has been Sinhalese 
policy to establish ‘colonies’ of Sinhalese settlers (mostly 
farmers) in the Eastern province especially, an area traditionally 
viewed by Tamil nationalists as “theirs” (Lewer and William, 
2002, p.3).
The Eastern province of Sri Lanka constitutes a part of 
what is called the “Dry Zone”, an area requiring extensive 
irrigation systems in order for agriculture to flourish. At 
independence the Sinhalese presence in the Dry Zone 
and in the Eastern province was quite small relative to 
the rest of the country, although there is belief among 
some Sinhalese that in past generations there was a much 
greater presence (Moore, 1985, p.45). 
Sinhalese political leaders have invoked this belief 
and utilized it as a basis (in part) for the settler program 
of the post-independence period. “The colonization of the 
Dry Zone by landless peasant cultivators from the Wet 
Zone remained one of the highest policy priorities for all 
governments until 1970” (Peebles, 1990, p.37). LTTE 
apprehension regarding an alleged Sri Lankan government 
(GoSL) plan to “Sinhalese” the Eastern province has been 
persistent, and may have some justification.
Located at the intersection of the eastern and northern provinces, 
Tricomalee district has been the site of deliberate attempts by 
Sinhalese nationalists, with support from the government, to 
break the contiguity of a Tamil-speaking north east by settling 
additional Sinhalese. Due in large part to irrigation settlements, 
the ethnic balance shifted considerably over the last century, 
with Sinhalese increasing from 4 per cent of the population in 
1911 to a high of 33 per cent in 1981 and to their current figure 
of roughly 24 per cent, (ICG, 2008b, p.23).
National governments have seized upon settler 
programs as a means of maintaining the territorial 
integrity of the state by choosing to define the state as 
a “nation-state”, utilizing the original definition of the 
latter, as a political entity enclosing a territory wherein 
resides a relatively homogenous (whether based on 
religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other grounds) population 
(Kelman, 1997, p.334). In most modern states of course, 
this condition is decidedly not the case, with most states 
anything but homogenous. By maintaining fidelity to this 
ideal, a national government can then go further and say 
that the nation-state’s territory must be defended by seeing 
to it that the territory encompassed by the state’s defined 
boundaries is populated, or re-populated, as it were, with 
members of the national majority population. 
In Sri Lanka, the LTTE made it clear that Sinhalese 
enclaves in the Eastern province would not be made 
welcome. It is not clear how much, if any, of a Sinhalese 
presence would have been allowed in the LTTE proposed 
Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) that was 
discussed in the 2004/2005 negotiations between the LTTE 
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and the Sri Lankan government (GoSL, 2005). Ultimately 
the GoSL determined there would be no recognition of an 
ISGA, ended the ceasefire and negotiations, and sought a 
military solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka.
This step was taken despite the urging of mediators 
to continue negotiations. Articulating their “strong 
concerns”– Japan, the U.S., the EU and Norway, the peace 
process co-chairs– repeated their conviction that ‘there 
is no military solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka and 
reiterate[d] their support for a negotiated settlement’ (ICG, 
2008a, p.3). A military “solution” to the conflict has in 
fact been attained in Sri Lanka in the sense that the LTTE 
has been defeated in the field. But the underlying causes 
of the conflict may not have been eradicated. “To date 
there is no decisive evidence of a government policy to 
bring in large numbers of new Sinhalese, just allegations 
and many worrying signs. Government officials have 
made no serious effort to respond to allegations of plans 
to Sinhalese the east, other than occasional pro forma 
denials” (ICG, 2008b, p.27).
The Concept of Self-Government 
The LTTE offer of the ISGA received only a very guarded 
reception by the GoSL. Because the LTTE insisted that re-
starting negotiations in 2005 had to take up the question 
of an ISGA as the sole issue for discussion, the possibility 
of an ISGA actually coming to fruition never rose in a 
serious manner, in that the government refused to initiate 
talks solely on that basis (Chandrasekharan, 2004). The 
government was prepared to discuss the concept of 
an ISGA only in the context of a finding a ‘permanent 
settlement’ to the conflict .
 [T]he government has agreed to the concept of setting up an 
Interim Authority within the context of negotiating a permanent 
settlement to the ethnic conflict, on the basis that an Interim 
Authority will be useful in a transitional period from a situation 
of conflict to one of democracy. Agreeing to negotiate an 
Interim Authority in such a context is very different from 
opening negotiation solely on the basis of the LTTE demand of 
the Interim Self-Governing Authority , which prevents the re-
opening of direct negotiations (GoSL, 2005).
 In the LTTE proposal for the ISGA, the only mention 
of the Sinhalese community in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces was under the heading “Composition of the 
ISGA” where it was noted that “‘the Muslim and Sinhala 
communities in the north-east shall have representation 
in the ISGA” (Chandrasekharan, 2004). The brevity of 
this notation suggests that the LTTE was only willing to 
tolerate the presence of Sinhalese settlers arriving prior 
to the onset of the insurgency, not those who chose to 
migrate to the Northern and the Eastern provinces after 
the LTTE had made it know they were not welcome.
In September, 2003, the GoSL tendered an offer for an 
“interim administration in the northeast” (which appeared 
to suggest the topic of an island wide federal structure 
was open for discussion) to allow negotiations for an 
agreement on the final status for the Northern and Eastern 
provinces to go forward (Kronstadt & Vaughn, 2009, p.23). 
This offer was in part a response to a September, 2002, 
LTTE announcement that it would settle for internal self-
determination in the areas of ‘historical habituation of 
the Tamil-speaking peoples’ (Waldman, 2002, p.2). But 
the internal self-determination concept was incorporated 
in the ISGA put forward in October, 2003, and thereby 
received minimal consideration.
After a Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) negotiated 
in Oslo was reached in February, 2002, a break in 
formal negotiations occurred from April, 2003 through 
February, 2006. But the signing of the CFA did provide a 
sufficient “interlude” such that LTTE political head and 
military commander Velupillai Prabhakaran and Anton 
Balasingham, the LTTE’s chief negotiator, could hold 
a press conference where they articulated the LTTE’s 
interpretation of some key terms. Prabhakaran stressed 
three fundamental concepts in his remarks: a Tamil 
homeland, Tamil nationality and a Tamil right to self-
determination. “Once these fundamentals are accepted or a 
political solution is put forward by Sri Lanka recognizing 
these three fundamentals and if our people are satisfied 
with the framework of a solution that recognizes these 
core issues, then we will consider giving up the demand 
for Eelam” (Ganguly, 2004, p.908). Balasingham then 
elaborated on what the term self-determination meant for 
the LTTE leadership. 
We mean the right of people to decide their own political 
destiny-it can also apply to autonomy and self-governance. If 
autonomy and self-governance is given to our people we can 
say that internal self-determination is to some extent met. But 
if the Sri Lankan government rejects our demand for autonomy 
and self-governance and continues with repression, then as a 
last resort we will opt for secession-that also comes under self-
determination (Ganguly, 2004, p.908).
 In early 2006, the newly elected (November, 2005) 
government, with Mahinda Rajapaske as President, 
began a “two-track” peace process, which included a 
more aggressive military strategy, as well as a narrowly 
conceived negotiating agenda; namely, how to more 
effectively implement the CFA (ICG, 2006, p.10). The 
February, 2006, discussions produced no new initiatives, 
and the last session, conducted with the urging of 
Norwegian mediators in October, 2006, in Geneva, 
failed in the face of the deteriorating ceasefire in the field 
(Ubayasiri, 2006, p.5). 
 Clearly, the GoSL’s “interim administration” proposal 
did not contain an acceptance of “interim self-rule” 
(effectively what the ISGA mandated) for the North and 
East. An April, 2007, Rajapaske government devolution 
proposal for the North and East did not produce a positive 
LTTE response. “Overall, the Rajapaske proposals 
encourage centralization (and continuance of unitary state 
structure) under the guise of a dubious devolutionary 
system,” (Devotta, 2007, p.51). The lack of congruence 
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in proposals helped produce the October, 2006, end to the 
formal peace process (Ubayasiri, 2006, p.1).
A Military Solution
The pivotal event in the eventual end to the peace process 
in Sri Lanka was the decision by the LTTE to close the 
Mavil Aru sluice gates in the Trincomalee district of 
the Eastern province, and the military response of the 
GoSL to this LTTE action of 22 July, 2006 (ICG, 2006, 
p.11; LankaNewspapers, 2006, p.1). Although there was 
some indication the LTTE took this action (producing 
a humanitarian emergency for farmers, predominately 
Sinhalese, in the region) because of a shortage of 
irrigation water available for Tamil farmers residing 
in the area, there is a lack of clarity about the LTTE 
motivation (Kronstadt & Vaughn, 2009, p.25; ICG, 2006, 
p.11). The SLMM noted the government response was 
severe: “Following the closure of the Mavil Aru sluice 
gates on 22 July, 2006, the government embarked on a 
major military offensive operation between the Parties in 
the Trincomalee area severely endangering the civilian 
population” (LankaNewspapers, 2006, p.1) (emphasis 
added).
Extensive government military operations were 
initiated, and continued past the point when the gates were 
re-opened, which in August resulted in a forceful transfer 
of territory from the LTTE to government forces on 
Sampoor peninsula. Such a transfer of territory by force 
was a violation of the CFA (LankaNewspapers, 2006, p.2). 
Still, the government pressed ahead with its offensive 
throughout 2007, to the point that it gained full control 
of the Eastern province by July, 2007 (UN Secretary 
General, 2011, p.12). 
Despite purported government intimations it was open 
to resuming negotiations with the LTTE, a message that 
was transmitted to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice (Kronstadt & Vaughn, 2009, p.28), the SLA began 
a major push into the Northern province in the latter half 
of 2007. This effort met with sufficient success such that 
the government unilaterally abrogated the CFA, and the 
Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) establishing the 
Sri Lana Monitoring Mission SLMM, in January, 2008, a 
step which ended the activities of the SLMM (ICG, 2010, 
p.3). By the summer, 2008, the SLA had advanced to a 
close proximity with an international humanitarian ‘safe 
area’ known as the “Kilinochchi box”, within which the 
town of Kilinochchi served as the LTTE administrative 
headquarters.
In January, 2009, Kilinochchi was captured by 
the SLA, and the latter enclosed the remaining LTTE 
leadership, LTTE cadre, and a large number of civilians in 
an area of a few square kilometers along the shore of the 
Bay of Bengal (ICG, 2010, p.5). As the fighting continued, 
three progressively smaller “No Fire Zones”(NFZs) were 
established by the SLA, ostensibly to provide for the 
safety and well-being of the trapped civilians, although 
there is evidence a significant number perished (UN 
Secretary-General, 2011, p.23). The LTTE reportedly 
forcibly detained many civilians from leaving the NFZ 
(ICG, 2010, p.5). The SLA finally converged on the 
remaining LTTE leadership in May, 2009, and announced 
the death of LTTE leader Prabhakaran, and the end of the 
war on 19 May, 2009.
In his 2005 inaugural address President Rajapaksa 
noted that his approach to the problem of the North and 
East would be to reach a national consensus wherein the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the “unitary structure 
of the State, would be preserved” (Rajapaksa inaugural, 
2005, p.32) (emphasis added). There is little evidence that 
the Rajapaksa government ever deviated from a belief in 
a unitary system for Sri Lanka; there is ample evidence 
that the LTTE never wavered from its insistence on a 
devolution of powers away from the center to the North 
and East, in order to gain self-determination. Despite 
years of effort, the peace process in Sri Lanka was unable 
to make Tamil self-determination compatible with a 
unitary national government. 
II.  WAR END
The capture of the LTTE administrative capital 
Kilinochchi, in January, 2009, demarcated the beginning 
of the war’s final chapter. The period from January 
to May, 2009, reflected the strong military advantage 
gained by the SLA over the LTTE by that time, and this 
advantage culminated in the events which took place in 
Mullivaikal, a predominately Tamil village in the Vanni 
region of the Northern province. In the view put forward 
here, this advantage came about due to three factors: 
The first issue was the defection of Vinayagamoorthy 
Muralitharan (“Colonel Karuna”) ultimately to the GoSL 
and then into an alliance with the SLA. Karuna is a more 
than capable military leader, and had held high rank 
within the LTTE. He was able to draw support from the 
Tamil population, and provide intelligence and additional 
forces to the SLA (ICG, 2006, p.9). Secondly, the SLA 
had become far more proficient in battlefield tactics, and 
had acquired more modern weaponry, particularly air 
power. The latter became particularly effective as the 
territory still under LTTE control began to shrink rapidly 
in the last five months of the war (UN Secretary General, 
2011, p.15).
Thirdly, and critically, as the No Fire Zone (NFZ) in 
the conflict area became successively smaller in the last 
months , the SLA made an apparent crucial determination: 
if the loss of civilian life (especially Tamal civilians) 
had to occur in order to vanquish the LTTE completely, 
then so be it. That is to say, the rules in warfare that 
hostilities must be conducted “with distinction” or 
in a discriminatory manner (all efforts must be made 
not to harm non-combatants), and in accordance with 
proportionality (attacks causing “incidental” loss of life 
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is prohibited), were abandoned (Geneva Conventions, 
1949, Art. 3). Crucially, this means that in addition to 
the prohibition against targeting civilians deliberately, 
hostilities must not be conducted in a “reckless” manner, 
which is to say in a manner which would place non-
combatants “in harm’s way”. There are reports from 
international aid agencies that both prohibitions were 
violated (Amnesty International, 2009a, p.1).
The end of the war came at Mullivaykkal, a small town 
in the Vanni region of the Northern province. There was 
a series of militarily strategic events (all SLA victories) 
which occurred leading up to the fall of Mullivaykkal.
Then on 9 January 2009, the 57th and 58th Divisions of the SLA 
captured Kilinochchi. Both the President and the international 
community urged the LTTE to lay down its arms. On 9 January, 
the SLA 53rd and 55th Divisions captured Elephant Pass and freed 
the A9, bringing the entire highway under Government control 
for the first time in 23 years. Later that month, on 25 January, 
the 59th Division captured Mullaittivu, another important base. 
These events marked a new stage in the …armed conflict…
in which the ultimate defeat of the LTTE was imminent (U.N. 
Secretary General, 2011, p.21).
The GoSL declared the first NFZ on 20 January, 
2009, the second on 12 February, 2009, and the third on 
8 May, 2009. The stated intent of NFZs was to provide 
protection for civilians fleeing the fighting, and civilians 
were instructed by the GoSL to seek shelter in the zones. 
But there are well documented accounts indicating that 
the GoSL, despite public pronouncements to the contrary 
(GoSL, 2009), deliberately and repeatedly targeted the 
NFZs with heavy artillery, including Multiple Barrel 
Rocket Launchers (MBRLS) and air strikes from aircraft, 
and the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for 
reconnaissance (ICG, 2010, p.13-14). As unguided missile 
launchers, MBRLs are unable to discriminate effectively 
between combatants and non-combatants. It should be 
noted that the LTTE did not believe themselves to be 
bound by the NFZ boundaries. 
The SLA use of UAVs was apparently militarily very 
effective. “Throughout the Humanitarian Operations we 
gave this facility [UAVs] to the Ground Commanders. 
Therefore, when they were planning and executing the 
operations it was very helpful for the ground Commanders 
to see in front; to see where the enemy concentrations 
were, to see and locate where the fire was coming from, 
to neutralize and act accordingly,” (Amarrasinghe & 
Kahandawaarachchi, 2009). But this disclosure, by 
Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, strengthens 
the argument that the SLA had full knowledge of non-
military targets, i.e., hospitals, as well as LTTE troop 
concentrations, prior to shelling and aerial bombardment 
in the conflict zone. 
By April, 2009, the SLA approached Puthukkudiyiruppu, 
a community which the LTTE considered a “strategic 
stronghold,” with a major hospital, and the LTTE fought 
vigorously to hold the site against the SLA advance (U.N. 
Secretary-General, 2011, p.26). Puthukkudiyirauppu was 
taken by the SLA on 5 April, 2009, and in the fighting to 
take the area, the hospital located there (where wounded 
LTTE cadres had been taken) was shelled multiple times 
over a period of weeks, apparently not inadvertently 
(ICRC, 2009, No. 09/29; ICG, 2010, p.16). The GoSL 
issued press releases on 25 February and 27 April (GoSL, 
2009, Archives, p.27, February, and 27 April, 2009) 
indicating that the use of heavy artillery and combat 
aircraft had been suspended in the second and third NFZs, 
but there are credible reports this did not in fact occur 
(U.N. Secretary General, 2011, p.29). 
Despite their dire circumstances, the LTTE continued 
to fight, to the extent their dwindling military resources 
and supplies allowed. There are credible reports the LTTE 
used Tamil civilians as “buffers” or “shields” against SLA 
attacks, although the issue of “shielding” in the context of 
the civil war in Sri Lanka is not entirely straight forward. 
The LTTE wanted to keep the civilian population in the Vanni as 
long as possible…because they knew the security forces would 
continue to advance without regard to civilian casualties. Their 
calculation, ultimately an incorrect one, was that escalating 
civilian casualties would eventually get the attention of the 
international community to broker a ceasefire so the LTTE could 
regroup or perhaps enter negotiations (ICG, 2010, p.25).
It should be noted what is being said here. The 
LTTE was not putting Tamil individuals in the line of 
fire because of an expectation this would deter enemy 
fire (shielding); the LTTE put civilians in the line of fire 
expecting the enemy to fire upon them, causing casualties, 
which would bring international condemnation, and calls 
for a truce. This suggests the LTTE had placed a greater 
value on the survival of the organization, rather than on 
the lives of persons the organization purported to represent 
and defend. 
On 19 April, 2009, the second NFZ was penetrated by 
the SLA as far as the coastal area, and this action severed 
the NFZ into two sections, with the Northern half held 
by the SLA (U.N. Secretary General, 2011, p.33). The 
situation for the LTTE became increasingly desperate, 
as the organization, in addition to the already severe 
imbalance in weaponry, was by this time increasingly 
outmanned. The latter condition led to an accelerated 
program of child recruitment by the LTTE (U.S. Dept. 
of State, 2009, p.48). In addition to the raised level of 
child recruitment, the LTTE by this time had become 
more draconian in its determination to keep the Tamil 
population in the NFZ from escaping the SLA attacks. 
Individuals and groups caught attempting to escape were 
often shot and killed (U.N. Secretary General, 2011, p.34; 
U.S. Dept. of State, 2009, p.43). 
At the end of April, 2009, international relief agencies 
began to describe the situation for civilians in the 
Vanni region, and in the second NFZ in particular, as 
catastrophic. In February the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) had begun to evacuate the sick 
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and wounded among the trapped civilians by boat, and 
this effort continued into May (ICRC, 2009, No. 09/03). 
Also at the end of April, the GoSL Presidential Secretariat 
conceded the use of heavy caliber artillery and combat 
aircraft in the NFZ; prior to this admission the GoSL 
had denied the use of such weapons in the NFZ (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009a, News, 27 April; U.S. Dept. of State, 
2009, p.39). 
As the war neared its end in May, the actions of the 
LTTE became increasingly desperate. LTTE cadre were 
sent on numerous suicide mission, civilians attempting to 
flee were shot and killed with high frequency, and child 
recruitment to replenish the ranks of the LTTE cadre was 
intensified (U.N. Secretary-General, 2011, p.34-36; U.S. 
Dept. of State, 2009, p.43). The SLA reportedly raised the 
intensity of its shelling directed at the third and final NFZ, 
an extremely constricted area, where large numbers of 
civilians had congregated (ICG, 2010, p.5; ICRC, 2009, 
No. 09/03; U.S. Dept. of State, 2009, p.44). There were 
reports the LTTE shelled from positions it had taken in 
close proximity to civilian camps within the NFZ, which 
may have drawn targeted SLA shelling in response (U.S. 
Dept. of State, 2009, p.43).
ICRC rescue of civilians by boat ended on 9 May, 
2009. There may have been 100,000 civilians confined to 
a three square kilometer area of the final NFZ by this time 
(U.N. Secretary-General, 2011, p.35). In spite of the close 
proximity of civilians to LTTE positions, the shelling of 
the NFZ by the SLA intensified in the second week of 
May. On 15 May, 2009, the 58th and 59th divisions of the 
SLA (the 58th had been moving roughly southward and 
the 59th northward along the coast) linked on the coastline, 
leaving the LTTE leadership and the organization’s most 
hardened cadres enclosed in a small area of three square 
kilometers around Mullivaikkal. The majority of the 
LTTE top leadership was killed, including Prabhakharan, 
in an apparent last ditch attempt to break through SLA 
lines, on 18 May, 2009 (U.N. Secretary-General, 2011, 
p.36). Summary evaluations for the last days of the civil 
war in Sri Lanka comment that the final days brought 
“unimaginable humanitarian catastrophe,” (ICRC, 2009, 
No. 09/103), and “[b]y any standard, it was one of the 
worst and most concentrated acts of killing in the post-
World War II era” (Sivanendran, 2011, p.2).
Acts Attributed to the SLA
Certain actions alleged to have been taken by the SLA 
during the last five months of the war (January, 2009 to 
May, 2009) led directly to the deaths of tens of thousands 
of Tamil civilians. By “direct” I mean to convey the 
thought that after the SLA took the steps presented 
below, no other actor took any subsequent action which 
additionally facilitated the deaths of the civilians targeted 
by the SLA. As articulated by the Secretary-General, 
and U.S. State Dept. reports, each of which drew on 
information provided by credible sources, these actions 
were the following:
1) the SLA killed of civilians through widespread 
shelling in the Vanni, and particularly in the successive 
NFZs, using heavy artillery, and the use of combat 
aircraft.
2) the SLA deliberately shelled all hospitals in the 
Vanni, although there is credible evidence the SLA was in 
possession of the field coordinates for these hospitals.
3) the SLA willfully denied provision of food and 
medical supplies to the sick and wounded in the conflict 
zone.
Acts Attributed to the LTTE 
Drawn from the U.N. Secretary-General and U.S. State 
Dept. reports, these acts were the following:
1) the LTTE use of Tamil civilians to obstruct enemy 
fire in order to increase the ability of LTTE cadre, and 
particularly the top leadership, to survive.
2) the LTTE shot and killed Tamil civilians attempting 
to flee the combat zone. 
3) the LTTE killed civilians through the use of suicide 
attacks.
As in the case with the actions perpetrated by the SLA 
above, the actions taken by the LTTE led directly to the 
deaths of civilians. In the last months of the war the LTTE 
also engaged heavily in the practice of recruiting child 
soldiers, a practice which likely resulted in the deaths 
of hundreds of children. These children ultimately died 
in combat against the SLA. Though the SLA killed the 
children placed in combat, ultimate responsibility for their 
death resides with the LTTE.
These acts constituted either war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, contingent on the interpretation of the 
definition of each of these terms provided in relevant 
international legal documents, i.e., the Charter of the 
Nuremburg Tribunal and Judgment of the Tribunal 
(1950), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (1998), and Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (ICRC, 2011, IHL; ICRC, Rome 
statute, 1998; ICRC, Geneva Conventions, 1949). The U.S. 
State Dept. Report on the Sri Lanka conflict, for example, 
notes: “a determination about whether particular conduct 
would amount to a crime against humanity requires an 
assessment of the purpose and intent of government 
sponsored or sanctioned actions,” (2009, p.10). For the 
purposes of this article, however, it is enough to note that 
the actions of the GoSL and SLA contributed greatly to, 
if they did not directly bring about, the deaths of many 
thousands of Tamil civilians. But a similar charge must be 
brought against the LTTE; the evidence of LTTE brutality 
and callousness against the Tamil people is indisputable 
(Amnesty International, 5 Feb., 2009b, p.4).
Reliable figures estimating the total number of deaths 
in Sri Lanka during the last five months of the war are 
difficult to come by. The inherent difficulty is obvious: 
many individuals that died violently in the war have not 
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been found. The U.N. Secretary – General’s Report states 
“even today no figure has been accurately determined,” 
(2011, p.1). One of the best efforts to estimate the number 
of deaths in the January, 2009-May, 2009, period has been 
produced by the ICG.
Crisis Group has credible evidence that there were 330,000 
displaced civilians in the second NFZ and adjacent areas as 
of mid-to-late-February. At that same time, according to the 
government, there were between 33,000 and 38,000 internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) from the Vanni already in the camps in 
government held areas. That brings the total of known civilians 
to about 365,000. By the end of the fighting, the highest 
number of survivors registered in government-run camps was 
290,000 as of 26 May, 2009… Accepting these uncertainties, 
there is a plausible case that as many as 75,000 persons remain 
unaccounted for. Even if the figure of 330,000 is reduced 
by as many as 30,000, or some adjustment to the difference 
between 330,00 and 290,000 is made to account for civilians 
who may have been killed lawfully because they were directly 
participating in hostilities at the time they were targeted-a 
number Crisis Group believes is very low-or to account for 
some number that may have avoided government camps, it is 
still difficult to arrive at a figure for the killed or missing that is 
lower than 30,000 (ICG, 2010, p.6)
It should be stressed that “[t]he majority of civilian 
casualties in the final phases of the war were caused by 
Government shelling,” (U.N. Secretary-General, 2011, 
p.49). International court or tribunal decisions have stated 
that the failure to recognize the likelihood of civilian 
deaths due to indiscriminate shelling may be characterized 
as murder. A Judgment from an International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) case makes this clear, as 
cited by the U.N. Secretary-General’s Report (ICTY Trial, 
2005, Case No. IT-01-42-T).These estimated figures, 
along with the allegations attributing the civilian deaths 
to the SLA and the LTTE, are extremely disturbing. The 
balance of my effort in this article is to examine the 
possible motivation of the respective perpetrators. As 
much as possible, it is important to grasp how and why 
the two organizations brought these events about. 
Motivation
There is no attempt in this article to establish individual 
culpability for the actions outlined above, and alleged 
to have been perpetrated by the SLA and the LTTE, a 
number of which may rise to the level of war crimes, or 
crimes against humanity, as provided by Common Article 
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Articles 7 and 8 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Geneva Conventions, 1949, Art. 3; Rome Statute, 1997, 
Arts. 7, 8). But the allegations enumerated in the U.N. 
Secretary-General’s Report are accepted as credible and 
deserving of further investigation. 
 In terms of bringing charges in an international court 
or tribunal, e.g., the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), it remains to be seen if the 
U.N. Security Council which established the both the 
ICTY and the ICTR, after a thorough examination of 
the evidence, will take the step of establishing a similar 
tribunal for Sri Lanka (ICTY, 1993; ICTR, 1994). Sri 
Lanka is not a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC. ICC 
jurisdiction for Sri Lanka will likely not occur because 
the exercise of [ICC] jurisdiction is limited to cases in 
which the conduct in question occurred on the territory 
of, or the person accused is a national of, either a state 
party, or “a state not a party …that accept[s] the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in 
question,” (Rome Statute, 1998, arts. 12-14) (emphasis 
added). But my objective at this juncture is to set forth 
certain propositions regarding the events in Sri Lanka, in 
an effort to explain why those events occurred. 
What follows is a presentation of propositions 
regarding the motivations of the SLA and the LTTE in 
taking actions which led directly to the death of civilians. 
There is no claim made here that these propositions 
adequately explain SLA and LTTE actions during the 
last five months of the war, only that these propositions 
could serve as pathways to necessary and sufficient 
explanations.
LTTE Actions Causing Civilian Deaths 
1) Firing on civilians to prevent their leaving the conflict 
zone would keep others from attempting to flee, and 
thus demonstrate to the outside world the LTTE retained 
substantial support from the Tamil population in the 
Northern province, even until the final battle.
Support:
Particularly by the time the second NFZ was declared, 
the LTTE was increasingly in need of demonstrating 
solidarity amongst the population for the cause of Eelam. 
One way to show this was the case was by maintaining a 
minimal flow of new recruits from the population. Thus, 
the LTTE would on occasion fire upon Tamil civilians 
indiscriminately (killing women and children) to stem the 
outward general flow. (Amnesty International, 2009c, p.4; 
U.N. Secretary-General, 2011, p.34). This practice would 
provide at least a minimum recruitment “pool” from 
which the LTTE could draw upon.
2) Using civilians as a “buffer” would demonstrate to 
the outside world that the SLA was deliberately raising 
civilian casualty numbers, was cognizant of the result, 
and was unmoved by this truth. The unflinching continued 
offensive by the SLA could in turn prompt international 
intervention. Such an intervention, if brought about, might 
then create a “space” for another round of negotiations. 
Support:
There are credible reports the LTTE did forcibly 
prevent Tamil civilians (even if injured) from leaving the 
conflict zone seeking safer areas and medical treatment. 
These reports indicate the LTTE did use civilians as 
a buffer against SLA firing (Amnesty International, 
2009a; Amnesty International 2009d). It seems apparent 
the LTTE knew the SLA would use indiscriminate 
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weapons against the former’s cadres, which would in 
turn injure and kill the civilians the LTTE was holding 
in close proximity. There was an outcry by international 
humanitarian organizations, but the SLA did not relent. 
In point of fact, the GoSL Ministry of Defense issued the 
following statement in February, 2009. 
While the Security forces accept all responsibility to ensure the 
safety and protection of civilians in the Safety Zones, they are 
unable to give such an assurance to those who remain outside 
these zones. Therefore, the government, with full responsibility, 
urges all civilians to come to the safety Zones; and also states 
that as civilians who do not heed this call will be among 
LTTE cadres, the Security forces will not be able to accept 
responsibility for their safety (Human Rights Watch, 2009b).
SLA Actions Causing Civilian Deaths
1) The SLA was intent on gaining retribution against the 
LTTE for costly prior defeats. These defeats had been 
delivered on both a physical and on a reputational basis. 
Thus, the retribution was generated from two levels: one, 
to avenge prior physical damage to the SLA, in personnel 
and in military armaments; second, to redress past 
reputational damage brought upon the SLA, due to the 
latter’s inability to defeat a twenty-seven year insurgency. 
Support:
On at least two distinct occasions in the conflict, the 
SLA gained a clear military advantage over the LTTE, and 
seemingly was on the verge of defeating the insurgents. 
The first came in 1987, when the SLA mounted Operation 
Vadamarachchi (Operation Liberation) in an attempt to 
regain control of the Jaffna peninsula in the Northern 
Province (Sri Lankan Guardian, 2003). This offensive 
amounted to full blown conventional warfare, and there 
were reports that Prahabakaran was nearly captured. 
Partly due to Indian intervention, which ultimately 
resulted in the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord, and the 
dispatching of the Indian Peace Keeping force (IPKF) to 
the island, the LTTE and the leadership survived. Because 
the LTTE cadres refused to give up their arms, the IPKF 
actually took action against the LTTE in the late 1980s, 
but eventually left the country in March, 1990. Even 
though the SLA made deep inroads into the Jaffna region, 
the LTTE was able to re-constitute itself. Current GoSL 
defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa attributes the 
survival of the LTTE in 1987-8 to the Indian intervention 
(Sri Lankan Foundation, 2011).
The second key episode occurred as part of the GoSL’s 
“war for peace” campaign in 1994-5. In Operation 
Riviresa (Operation Sunrays) the objective was once 
again the Jaffna peninsula. After months of fighting the 
SLA succeeded in capturing the former Dutch fort in 
Jaffna, thereby regaining control of the Jaffna region 
for the first time in close to a decade. The GoSL held 
a solemn ceremony to mark the occasion (CNN World 
News, 1995). However, in mid-1996 the LTTE regrouped 
and defeated the SLA in a battle for Mullaitivu along the 
eastern coast as part of Operation Unceasing Waves I. In 
1998, after launching Operation Unceasing waves II, the 
LTTE captured Kilinochchi, followed by the taking of 
Elephant Pass (separating the Jaffna peninsula from the 
Vanni region) in April, 2000, during Operation Unceasing 
Waves III (UNHCR, 2001). Despite at times being visibly 
damaged by the SLA, the LTTE had demonstrated an 
ability to recoup, to the detriment of the SLA’s military 
stockpile and professional competency.
2) The SLA indiscriminate shelling of civilians in 
the NFZs, apparent intentional shelling of hospitals in 
the conflict zone, and the denial of medical treatment 
and supplies to persons in hospitals where wounded 
LTTE cadres were receiving treatment, was an attempt 
to minimize the likelihood that the LTTE could be re-
constituted at a future date, which could have occurred 
through the recruitment of known or suspected LTTE 
sympathizers who were able to survive the war.
Support:
On occasion the SLA would announce publicly their 
belief that hospitals were being used by the LTTE not just 
for medical treatment but also as communication centers, 
and as sites from which LTTE artillery would fire (U.S. 
Dept. of State, 2009, p.29). Such a belief could provide 
justification for the targeting of hospitals to kill wounded 
LTTE cadres. The SLA would utilize drone surveillance 
to monitor hospitals, followed shortly thereafter by 
shelling or aerial bombardment. The humanitarian 
agency Human Rights Watch reported to the U.S. State 
Dept. that “each time a hospital was established in a new 
location, GPS coordinates of the facility were transmitted 
to the Sri Lankan government to ensure that the facility 
would be protected from attack.” Witnesses said that on 
several occasions, attacks occurred on the day after the 
coordinates had been transmitted” (U.S. Dept. of State, 
2009, p.40). 
The last permanent medical facility in the Vanni 
was Puthukkudiyiruppu hospital, a facility whose 
GPS coordinates were “well known” to the SLA (U.N. 
Secretary General, 2011, p.26) A special ward for 
wounded LTTE cadres had been established in the 
hospital, and although it is difficult to prove, if the SLA 
had knowledge of this separate ward, it might account for 
the periodic shelling of the hospital, especially during the 
weeks between 9 January and 4 February, 2009, which 
otherwise would be difficult to explain, since the hospital 
was marked with emblems easily visible by UAVs (U.N. 
Secretary-General, 2011, p.26). In response to questions 
regarding the shelling of the PTK hospital, Defense 
Secretary Gotobaya Rajapaksa (brother of the GoSL 
President) remarked “… to crush the terrorists, there is 
nothing called unproportionate” (U.N. Secretary-General, 
2011, p.26; citing Skynews, 2009) (emphasis added).
By March, 2009, the absence of medical supplies in 
the conflict zone was causing great loss of life. 
Most of the hospital deaths could have been prevented if basic 
infrastructure facilities and essential medicines were made 
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available…We have been supplied with no antibiotics, no 
anesthetics and not even a single bottle of IV fluid, leaving us in 
a desperate situation of not being able to provide even lifesaving 
emergency surgery (U.N. Secretary-General, 201, p.38).
By mid-April, conditions had worsened. “Embassy 
Colombo was briefed regarding the severe shortage 
within the NFZ of medical supplies, including anesthesia, 
dressings,  and injection pain relief  medication. 
Organizations estimated that only 5% of needed supplies 
were being received, and avoidable deaths were occurring 
as a result,” (U.S. Dept. of State, 2002, p.56). 
The GoSL response to pleas from hospital medical 
personnel for increased medical supplies (for surgical 
purposes particularly) to treat increasing numbers of 
wounded, was to issue warnings. “You should bear in 
mind that in the event of your giving wrong information 
to any sources especially in regard to IDPs figures, 
[the] government will be reluctantly compelled to take 
disciplinary actions against you,” (ICG, 2010, p.22). It is 
difficult to comprehend this response to a medical plea, 
given the repeated public assurances from the GoSL 
of their concern for the safety of civilians, including a 
publicly stated policy of “zero civilian casualties,” (U.N. 
Secretary-General, 2011, p.48). A plausible explanation is 
that the GoSL believed medical treatment centers in the 
conflict zone housed wounded LTTE cadres. The GoSL 
apparently had the intention of reducing the likelihood 
these cadres would recover, and be able to return to the 
front, or to re-group at a later date and begin work to re-
constitute the LTTE. 
CONCLUSIONS
In the instance of civil war with one protagonist a 
territorially based insurgency, the argument between the 
national government and the insurgency is one where 
the latter seeks self-determination in part based on the 
concept of a homeland having a distinct demographic 
quality.  The state,  on the other hand, insists on 
maintaining national territorial integrity in part based on 
an achieved, or created, demographic character. Within 
the contested “homeland” region the insurgency seeks 
minority population primacy. The state wants a contiguous 
presence of the majority population across the expanse 
of national territory. But it is not clear whether homeland 
self-determination can be achieved within, or along side 
of, national majority population contiguity.
In terms of gauging the likelihood of successful 
negotiations, it matters whether, and if so, how “hard” 
the state has pushed for majority population demographic 
dominance (a population density ratio in its favor) in the 
homeland area. In this inquiry, a minority population 
has sought to reverse the state’s decision to “embark 
on or (continue) all-too-familiar ‘nation-building’ 
programs designed to obliterate minority group identities” 
(Buchanan, 1997, p.55). In the case considered here, the 
state has worked quite diligently to alter the demographic 
circumstances “on the ground.” In Sri Lanka, the Tamil 
population advantage in the Eastern province had been 
reduced to roughly two-to-one by the time the LTTE 
insurgency had gained a foothold.
The issue of intent must be addressed here. One can 
argue that the SLA did not intend to cause the death of 
thousands of Tamil civilians. If we accept GoSL public 
statements regarding the government’s concern for the 
safety of civilians, then the civilian deaths brought about 
by the SLA were inadvertent; they were ancillary to SLA 
efforts to defeat the LTTE. The SLA then, did not hold 
Tamil civilians within the conflict zone in the Northern 
province to be complicit in the LTTE resistance (Rothbart 
and Korostelina, 2011, p.30). But it was the GoSL’s view 
that civilians compressed into successively smaller NFZs 
could not be allowed to hinder the SLA’s final offensive 
against the LTTE. This was made evident by the Ministry 
of Defense statement (reported above) urging “all civilians 
to come to the safety Zones” and then the government 
statement, “as civilians who do not heed this call will 
be among LTTE cadres, the Security Forces will not be 
able to accept full responsibility for their safety” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009b).
Embedded in this statement is a war strategy which 
explicitly would not forego or delay defeat of the LTTE 
simply to save civilian lives; the GoSL could have 
accepted responsibility for the safety of civilians in the 
shrinking NFZ, but chose not to do so. This war fighting 
strategy demeans the value of civilian lives. “In this form 
of thinking, civilian suffering is unintended, unavoidable, 
unsystematic, and consistent with humanitarian laws of 
war,” (Rothbart and Korostelina, 2011, p.183) (emphasis 
added). But it is also true that by using civilians as 
“buffers” and shooting civilians attempting to flee the 
conflict zone, the LTTE obviously had intended to bring 
about the deaths of civilians (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009, 
p.23; ICG, 2010, p.25). The LTTE could have abstained 
from using civilians as shields, or firing upon civilians 
attempting to escape the conflict zone, but chose to 
commit these acts. Bringing about the loss of life from 
these acts was clearly intentional on the part of the LTTE. 
The SLA strategy, and the tactics of the LTTE resulted 
in an inexcusable loss of life. While the SLA did not 
intend to produce this loss of life, it did little to minimize 
it, while the LTTE did have this intention. SLA actions 
were meant to produce a military victory, while the LTTE 
actions were meant to avoid defeat. The LTTE leadership 
effectively no longer exists, but the group of key GoSL 
governing decision makers, which implemented the war 
fighting strategy described herein, remains in place. In 
rendering a judgment on what occurred in the last five 
months of the Sri Lankan civil war, and determining 
culpability of the adversaries in that war, no distinction 
should be made regarding whether the deplorable loss of 
civilian life was intentional, or not.
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